Award term incentive: how it might be implemented at U.S. Naval procurement activities by Lowther, James M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2001-12
Award term incentive: how it might be implemented
at U.S. Naval procurement activities.
Lowther, James M.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/9708
 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 
THESIS 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
AWARD TERM INCENTIVE:  HOW IT MIGHT BE 









 Thesis Advisor:  Ron Tudor 


























 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, 
including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and 
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments 
regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the 
Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1.  AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave 
blank)            
2.   REPORT DATE   
December 2001 
3.  REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Award Term Incentive:  How Might it be 
Implemented at U.S. Naval Procurement Activities 
5.  FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6.  AUTHOR (S) Lowther, James M. 
 
7.  PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8.  PERFORMING ORGANIZATION  
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11.  SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect 
the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a.  DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
     In this day of acquisition reform, Government contracting officers are continually urged to “think 
out of the box” for ways to deliver better contracting products and services to customers.  Award term 
incentive, a variation of the award fee incentive described in FAR 16.405-2, was first used in 
Government contracting 1997.  It has been used in those situations where a long-term business 
relationship is seen as being advantageous to both the contractor and the Government.  The purpose of 
this thesis is to evaluate the critical issues associated with establishing strategic long-term 
purchasing relationships between U.S. Naval procurement activities and their suppliers through the use 
of the award term incentive.  The thesis considers the elements of the award term incentive in order to 
identify barriers to successfully implementing this best commercial practice.  The methodology employed 
to gather data was a survey distributed to Navy contracting activities.  The survey data was analyzed 
to identify the key issues of effectively utilizing the award term incentive.  The thesis concludes 











14. SUBJECT TERMS Award Term Incentive, Commercial Best Practices, 
Contract Incentives  





















NSN 7540-01-280-5500                                                 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)   








































































































In this day of acquisition reform, Government 
contracting officers are continually urged to “think out of 
the box” for ways to deliver better contracting products 
and services to customers.  Award term incentive, a 
variation of the award fee incentive described in FAR 
16.405-2, was first used in Government contracting in 1997.  
It has been used in those situations where a long-term 
business relationship is seen as being advantageous to both 
the contractor and the Government.  The purpose of this 
thesis is to evaluate the critical issues associated with 
establishing strategic long-term purchasing relationships 
between U.S. Naval procurement activities and their 
suppliers through the use of the award term incentive.  The 
thesis considers the elements of the award term incentive 
in order to identify the barriers to successfully 
implementing this best commercial practice.  The 
methodology employed to gather data was a survey 
distributed to Navy contracting activities.  The survey 
data was analyzed to identify the key issues of effectively 
utilizing the award term incentive.  The thesis concludes 
with recommendations for implementing the use of award term 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PREFACE  
The use of best commercial practices in Department of 
Defense (DOD) acquisitions received heightened attention in 
2000.  In November 2000, Dr. Gansler, Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Technology released a 
memorandum outlining the results of a price-based 
acquisition (PBA) study conducted earlier in the year.  Dr. 
Gansler stated that: 
PBA is one of a number of strategies that we are 
pursuing to move towards greater access to 
commercial technologies, products, and processes, 
as well as to achieve far greater efficiency and 
effectiveness from our traditional defense 
suppliers. [Ref. 1] 
The study group made a number of recommendations for 
employing best commercial practices to DOD acquisitions.  
These recommendations included: 
1. Require Operational Users to State What They are 
Willing to Pay for an Acquired Capability in the 
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) 
The intent of this requirement is to ensure that 
program estimates are updated to reflect changing 
requirements and to establish operational user 
accountability for the total price of the requirement.  
This ensures that DOD acquisition monies are efficiently 
distributed. 
2. Use Value-Based Pricing to Determine Price 
Reasonableness 
This pricing technique determines price reasonableness 
based on the quantifiable benefit or utility that a user 
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derives from consuming a product or service.  This 
measurement is independent of the actual cost of producing 
or providing the product or service. 
3. Investigate Performance-Based Payments 
Linking a contractor’s payments to critical aspects of 
technical and schedule performance prior to contract award, 
instead of basing the payments on cost, allows the payments 
to be a sort of earned value management system.  Forcing 
the contractor and Government to develop meaningful 
criteria early in the acquisition process results in pulse 
points, or performance indicators, that can be used 
throughout the life of the program. 
4. Consider Developing Incentive-Term Contracts 
This incentive provides the contractor with the 
opportunity to earn additional contract length for good 
contract performance.  The additional periods of 
performance are the incentive, rather than award fees. 
In January 2001, Dr. Gansler signed out the Guidebook 
for Performance-Based Services Acquisition (PBSA) in the 
DOD.  The thrust of this document is that since acquisition 
of service is becoming a bigger component of DOD 
procurements, DOD should strive to adopt best commercial 
practices.  Doing this allows DOD to reach world-class 
commercial suppliers, gain greater access to technological 
innovations, maximize competition and obtain best value 
while achieving greater savings and efficiencies. 
The goals of the guidebook are: 
• To promote performance-based strategies for 
services acquisitions throughout the 
Department of Defense. 
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• To educate the acquisition workforce and 
highlight the key elements of performance-
based services acquisition. 
• To encourage innovative business practices 
within the DOD acquisition process. 
• To increase awareness that performance-based 
services acquisitions require participation 
from all stakeholders (the users, 
acquisition workforce personnel and 
industry) to ensure the requirement is 
adequately satisfied.  [Ref. 2] 
Contracting areas that would benefit from the use of 
innovative business practices are discussed in the 
guidebook.  Such areas include: 
• Developing performance-based work statements. 
• Contractor performance management. 
• Source Selection. 
• Incentives. 
• Contract Administration.  [Ref. 2] 
Under incentives, the award term incentive is 
discussed in detail.  Award term is looked at as a means 
for establishing strategic purchasing relationships within 
the DOD procurement environment.  As long as the contractor 
meets the established standards, the contract is extended 
up to the maximum number of terms identified in the 
contract [Ref. 3]. 
The fact that the award term incentive is mentioned in 
both of Dr. Gansler’s documents suggests that it is a topic 
worthy of additional research.  Although award term 
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arrangements are relatively new, the Air Force has already 
utilized this incentive in a number of its contracts and 
other Services are beginning to consider its use.  In this 
chapter, the research objectives, questions and methodology 
are identified.  Research scope, limitations and benefits 
are also described. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
This research evaluates the critical issues associated 
with establishing strategic long-term purchasing 
relationships between U.S. Naval procurement activities and 
their suppliers through the use of the award term 
incentive.  It also considers the elements of the award 
term incentive – contractors, nature of the buy, legal 
issues and acquisition professional skill mix – in order to 
identify barriers to successful implementation. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Research conducted on the award term incentive 
concentrates on one primary and three secondary research 
questions. 
1. Primary Research Question 
The primary research question is:  What are the 
primary factors involved in the decision to utilize the 
award term incentive at U.S. Naval procurement activities, 
and what are the issues involved in the effective 
application of this incentive? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• What is the background and history of the award 
term incentive? 
• What are the advantages and disadvantages of the 
award term incentive? 
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• What are the key issues involved with the 
Government’s attempt to implement the award term 
incentive?  
D. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION 
The scope of this thesis includes: (1) A review of the 
history and regulations regarding the use of award term in 
Government procurement; (2) An examination of current 
contracts utilizing award term in DOD procurement; (3) 
Presentation of issues and concerns associated with 
utilizing award term at a representative U.S. Naval 
procurement activity; (4) Analysis of conditions required 
to be met in order to successfully use award term; and (5) 
Review the benefits associated with using award term. 
This research is broken out into five chapters: (1) 
Introduction of the topic; (2) Background information on 
the award term incentive; (3) The Navy’s use of award term; 
(4) Analysis of the information gathered with a survey; and 
(5) Conclusions and recommendations for further study. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis research consists 
of several steps.  First, a comprehensive literature review 
of books, magazine articles, CD-ROM systems, Government 
reports, Internet based materials and other library 
information resources was conducted.  Second, data was 
collected on award term usage via a survey.  The survey was 
conducted online with the assistance of the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) Office of Strategic Planning, 
Educational Assessment and Institutional Research (SPEAR).  
The purpose of the 16-question survey was to assess current 
awareness of the award term incentive and to capture any 
concerns or issues present with contracting officers at 
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U.S. Naval commands.  The survey consisted of a mix of 
multiple-choice and fill-in-the-blank questions.  The 
survey was sent out to seventy commands and a response rate 
of 26% was achieved.  The last step involved conducting 
interviews, either in person or by telephone, with 
acquisition professionals at U.S. Naval procurement 
activities.  Interviewees were selected based on responses 
received from the survey.  The purpose of the interviews 
was to allow for follow-up questions to survey responses. 
F. BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis is intended to primarily benefit U.S. 
Naval procurement activities, in regards to implementing 
the use of the award term incentive.  By analyzing the 
issues associated with the award term incentive, this 















A. AWARD TERM – CONTRACTING’S NEWEST INCENTIVE 
Under acquisition reform, Government contracting 
officers are continually urged to “think out of the box” 
for ways to deliver better contracting products and 
services to customers.  Award term incentive, a variation 
of the award fee incentive described in Federal Acquisition 
Regulations (FAR) 16.405-2, was first used in Government 
contracting in 1997 even though it was not expressly stated 
in the FAR as an authorized incentive [Ref. 4].  It rewards 
a contractor’s good performance by extending the contract 
period without competition. 
The award term process is almost identical to award 
fee procedures [Ref. 5].  The Award Term Review Board 
(ATRB) uses an Award Term Plan to rate contractor 
performance and makes a recommendation to a Term 
Determining Official (TDO) [Ref. 5].  The TDO makes the 
final decision on the contractor’s score for the period.  
The contractor’s performance period may be extended or 
reduced based on the contractor’s cumulative score.  If the 
contractor earns an award term, it is entitled to the 
extension as long as the Government has a continuing need 
for the service and funds are available.  As is the case 
with award fee contracts, a cost benefit analysis should be 
performed to show that the expected benefits justify the 
expenditure of time, money and manpower in monitoring 
contractor performance. 
There are two basic approaches used in evaluating 
contractor performance [Ref. 6].  The first is the “Pass-
  8
Fail” method.  The TDO rates performance during an 
evaluation period as “excellent”, “acceptable” or 
“unacceptable” overall.  The contractor receives feedback 
during the evaluation period, and an award term is earned 
if performance is rated “excellent” overall.  The second 
approach is the “incremental point scoring” method.  Here, 
the TDO awards performance points periodically.  The 
contractor accumulates points during the evaluation period 
until an award term is earned or the period expires.  Both 
approaches can be very subjective in nature; however, award 
term contracting is most effective when the performance 
metrics chosen are objective goals [Ref. 6]. 
B. AWARD TERM DEFINITIONS 
1. Award Term 
An award term is used to extend the contract period of 
performance.  The contractor earns the award term by 
rendering excellent service.  An award term is not an 
option.  An option is exercised as a unilateral right of 
the Government.  An award term entitles a contractor to an 
extension as long as the Government has a continuing need 
for the service and funds are available. 
An award term incentive requires three contractual 
elements: 
• A contract line item for each prospective award 
term. 
• An award term clause that describes the terms of 
the incentive. 
• An award term plan that describes the incentive 
criteria. 
2. Award Term Clause  
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An award term clause describes the rights and 
obligations of the Government and the contractor under the 
incentive.  Appendix A contains an example of an award term 
clause. 
3. Award Term Plan 
The award term plan lays out the Government’s 
objectives, performance criteria, performance standards and 
length of the award term performance evaluation periods.  
Appendix B contains a generic example of an award term 
plan. 
4. Award Term Review Board (ATRB) 
Common responsibilities of the award term board are: 
Review the Performance Monitor’s evaluation of 
the contractor’s performance, consider all 
information from pertinent sources, prepare 
interim performance reports and arrive at the 
earned award term points recommendation to be 
presented to the Term Determining Official.  The 
ATRB will also recommend changes to the award 
term plan.  An assessment of the contractor’s 
performance will be done on a yearly basis.  
[Ref. 5] 
5. Award Term Review Board Chairperson 
Common responsibilities of the ATRB chairperson are: 
Chairs the meetings of the ATRB and appoints the 
non-mandatory members of the board and the 
Performance Monitors.  The ATRB chairperson 
briefs the Term Determining Official on 
recommended earned term amounts and the 
contractor’s overall performance and recommends 




6. Award Term Review Board Recorder 
The ATRB Recorder coordinates the administrative 
actions required by the Term Determining Official, the ATRB 
and the Performance Monitors. 
7. Contracting Officer 
Common responsibilities of the contracting officer 
include: 
The liaison between contractor and Government 
personnel.  Subsequent to the Term Determining 
Official’s decision, the contracting officer 
evaluates the award term points available and 
modifies the contract period of performance, if 
necessary, to reflect the decision.  [Ref. 5] 
8. Performance Monitors 
Common responsibilities of performance monitors are: 
Maintain written records of the contractor’s 
performance in their assigned evaluation areas so 
that a fair and accurate evaluation is obtained.  
Monitors prepare interim and end-of-period 
evaluation reports as directed by the ATRB.  
[Ref. 5] 
9. Strategic Partnerships 
A strategic partnership is defined as: 
An agreement between a buyer and a supplier that 
involves a commitment over an extended time 
period, and includes the sharing of information 
along with a sharing of the risks and reward of 
the relationship.  [Ref. 7] 
10. Term Determining Official (TDO) 
The Term Determining Official: 
Approves the award term plan and any significant 
changes to it.  The TDO reviews the 
recommendations of the ATRB, considers all 
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pertinent data and determines the earned award 
term points for each evaluation period.  The TDO 
appoints the ATRB chairperson.  [Ref. 5] 
C. COMMERCIAL USAGE 
The award term incentive is an attempt to incorporate 
commercial best business practices into Government 
contracting.  Private companies develop long-term 
relationships with suppliers of their choosing.  The 
success of the relationship depends on the supplier’s 
ability to perform.  As long as the supplier is able to 
perform satisfactorily, the relationship continues.  If 
performance becomes unacceptable, a private company is free 
to take its business elsewhere.  This is award term 
contracting in its purest form.  The use of the award term 
incentive provides a similar approach in Government 
contracting.  
D. REGULATORY ISSUES 
DOD acquisition has been the subject of numerous 
commissions calling for reform to streamline the process, 
cut costs and maintain or improve mission capability.  Some 
of the recommendations include: 
• Emulation of private sector buying practices 
(1983 Grace Commission). 
• Decreased use of military specifications 
(Mil specs) and increased use of commercial 
products (1983 Grace Commission and 1986 
Packard Commission). 
• Use of commercial style competition rather 
than price-based competition (1970 Fitzhugh 
Commission and 1986 Packard Commission). 
[Ref. 8] 
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The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 
1994 and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) of 1996 
were enacted to enable DOD to develop ways to reduce costs.  
FARA requires compliance with 41 U.S.C 404, which states 
that government-wide procurement policies, regulations and 
procedures must promote economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness in the procurement of property and services 
by the executive branch of the Federal Government [Ref. 8]. 
The 1970 Fitzhugh Commission and the 1986 Packard 
Commission call for the use of best commercial practices 
whenever possible.   
Best commercial practices are those practices 
that have proved to be successful by the 
commercial sector as evidenced by quantifiable 
cost reductions or gains in competitive advantage 
that can be replicated.  [Ref. 8] 
DOD’s use of commercial purchasing practices in 
response to the acquisition reform initiatives was limited 
through the mid-1990s.  Research conducted by the Air Force 
Institute of Technology (AFIT), “suggests that using 
commercial practices and removing regulatory obstacles 
enhances the potential for reducing costs [Ref. 8].”  It 
follows then that if DOD implements the use of commercial 
best practices, the Government may achieve significant 
savings in DOD acquisition programs. 
The use of the award term incentive is an attempt to 
employ a commercial idea within the framework of the rules 
that govern Government contracting.  The commercial sector 
recognizes that the best way to motivate a firm to provide 
excellent service is to offer the prospect of additional 
sales.  This can be done without contractual terms and 
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conditions in the commercial world.  The Government cannot 
do this.  The Government’s competition rules, like the 
Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), “require agencies to 
take an express and formal approach to applying commercial 
ideas.  This requires careful planning, design and 
administration [Ref. 8].” 
Incentives described in the FAR include fixed price 
incentives, firm fixed price with award fees, cost plus 
incentive fee and cost plus award fee.  Each of these 
incentives promises to reward excellent performance with 
additional profit or fee.  Award term incentive is 
different because it does not promise additional profit or 
fee, but instead it offers additional sales as its 
incentive.  This is a long-term incentive that is much more 
attractive to many contractors than the prospect of short 
term gains.  In that respect, award term incentive is much 
closer to a commercial incentive than any of the incentives 
covered in the FAR. 
As stated earlier, award term incentives are not 
discussed in the FAR.  Proponents of award term argue that 
since award term is an incentive and not a contract type, 
its use is covered under FAR 1.102-4(e): 
If a policy or procedure, or a particular 
strategy or practice, is in the best interest of 
the Government and is not specifically addressed 
in the FAR, nor prohibited by law (statute or 
case law), Executive order or other regulation, 
Government members of the Team should not assume 
it is prohibited.  Rather, absence of direction 
should be interpreted as permitting the Team to 
innovate and use sound business judgment that is 
otherwise consistent with law and within the 
limits of their authority.  Contracting officers 
should take the lead in encouraging business 
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process innovations and ensuring that business 
decisions are sound. [Ref. 9] 
Opponents of the award term incentive argue that a 
contract that includes an award term incentive is in fact a 
new “type” of contract.  Since they consider it a new 
contract type, opponents cite FAR 16.102(b) to support 
their position: 
Contract types not described in this regulation 
shall not be used, except as a deviation under 
Subpart 1.4.  [Ref. 9] 
Since award term is considered by opponents to be a 
contract type, FAR 1.102-4(e) would not give the 
Contracting Officer the authority to utilize it.  Its use 
would be further limited because of the FAR 16.105 
requirement to add the FAR 52.101 “solicitation provision” 
to solicitations: 
Type of Contract (APR 84) The Government 
contemplates award of a _____________[Contracting 
Officer insert specific type of contract] 
contract resulting from this solicitation. [Ref. 
9] 
Additional arguments against the use of the award term 
incentive are that its use would violate the requirements 
of CICA and/or the Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA).  Supporters 
contend that award term use is consistent with CICA because 
the same rules that apply to the exercise of options apply 
to award terms.  As long as the request for proposal (RFP) 
states the maximum length of the contract, including all 
prospective award terms, includes separate line items for 
each prospective award term and requires each prospective 
award term to be priced, CICA requirements are being met.  
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These conditions in the RFP will help prevent buy-in from 
the contractor.  ADA requirements are met as long as the 
contract states that the Government’s obligation with 
regard to the award term extensions is conditioned upon the 
availability of funds and that no work is permitted to 
commence during any award term extension before funds are 
made available. 
Since the use of award term is a relatively recent 
event, judicial challenges to the use or implementation of 
the award term incentive have not occurred.  A search of 
the Lexis-Nexis database yielded no court cases and no GAO 
protests were found.  Protests and court cases will be 
expected in the next couple of years, as the first 
contracts utilizing the award term come to the end of the 
base contract agreements and get into the award term 
periods. 
E. AWARD TERM USE IN THE GOVERNMENT 
The use of the award term incentive would be 
beneficial in those situations where: 
• There is a requirement for services that extends 
more than five years, either for a definite 
period or indefinitely. 
• Contractor performance above a minimum standard 
would be beneficial and desirable. 
• The desired level of performance is attainable, 
but difficult to achieve. 
• The advantages of establishing a long-term, 
strategic partnership outweigh the disadvantages. 
DOD began using the award term incentive in 1997.  The 
first service to utilize this tool was the Air Force.  The 
Air Force Materiel Command, based out of Wright-Patterson 
AFB, believes in the award term concept so much that it set 
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up a separate award term operating cell.  A recommendation 
to include the award term incentive in the AFFARS has also 
been submitted.  Examples of how the award term incentive 
has been used includes: 
• Air Force acquisition of simulation services 
where the contractor maintains ownership of the 
system.  Contractor maintains system concurrency 
with the aircraft and provides logistical support 
for the system.  Base contract is for seven years 
with the possibility of earning eight annual 
award terms, for a potential contract length of 
15 years.  Earned award term periods may be lost 
based on contractor performance. 
• Air Force acquisition of network services.  The 
contractor provides network service that links 
together distributed mission training to provide 
partners with the capability to conduct team 
training.  Service includes daily operations and 
support.  Base contract is for five years with 
the possibility of earning 11 annual award terms, 
for a potential contract length of 16 years.  
Base years and earned award term periods may be 
lost based on contractor performance. 
• Air Force acquisition of aircraft engine overhaul 
and repair services.  Contractor is responsible 
for scheduled overhaul maintenance and for 
diagnoses and repair.  Base contract is for seven 
years with the possibility of earning eight 
annual award terms, for a potential contract 
length of 15 years.  Base years and earned award 
term periods may be lost based on contractor 
performance. 
• Navy acquisition for engineering services for 
Fixed Surveillance Systems.  Contractor provides 
SPAWAR PMW-181 with technical and engineering 
services to support design, development, 
integration, logistics, life cycle support and 
training for Fixed Surveillance Sensor Systems.  
Base contract is five years with the possibility 
of earning 10 annual award terms, for a potential 
contract length of 15 years.  [Ref. 10] 
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• Navy acquisition for port services in Yokohama, 
Japan.  Contractor provided services include:  
stevedoring, long shoring and allied services.  
Base contract is for one year with the 
possibility of earning five annual award terms, 
for a potential contract length of six years. 
• GSA acquisition of information technology support 
services under the Millennia Lite program.  
Contractor-provided services include: engineering 
and manufacturing, testing and validation, 
reliability and maintainability, reverse 
engineering and statistical analysis.  Base 
contract is for three years with the possibility 
of earning 10 annual award terms, for a potential 
contract length of 13 years.  [Ref. 11] 
• NASA acquisition of institutional services at the 
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center’s Wallops Flight 
Facility, Wallops Island, VA.  Contractor 
provides janitorial service, security, fire 
protection and grounds maintenance.  Base 
contract is for four years with the possibility 
of earning six annual award terms, for a 
potential contract length of 10 years.  [Ref. 12] 
None of the examples above are into the award terms as 
of yet. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The award term incentive is such a new tool that 
performance information of the administration phase is not 
yet available.  However, the incentive seems to appeal to a 
contractor’s desire for additional time (and additional 
sales) on the performance of a contract.  Given the rules 
that bind Government contracting, it is a significant step 
toward commercial practices.  Conversely, questions remain 
in some contracting activities about the legality of the 
award term incentive. 
This chapter gave a brief overview of the award term 
concept and some of the legal issues that surround this 
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incentive.  Examples of contracts that have already been 
awarded utilizing the award term incentive were also 
provided.  The next chapter will take a closer look at 
advantages and disadvantages of the award term concept and 
how this tool can be used in Navy procurement. 
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III. NAVY’S USE OF AWARD TERM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Chapter II gave a brief summary of what the award 
term incentive is and how it has been used in DOD 
procurement.  This chapter delves into the issues 
associated with the use of the award term incentive – what 
are advantages and disadvantages of its use.  This chapter 
also discusses the factors that may drive the decision to 
utilize award terms and how the Navy can effectively 
incorporate award terms into its contracts.  Finally, the 
chapter looks at how the award term evaluation process can 
flow in a Navy procurement office. 
B. ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH USE OF AWARD TERM 
1. Award Term Benefits 
Why is award term such an attractive option?  A study 
conducted by J. Ronald Fox in 1968 showed that companies 
take actions to: 
• Expand company operations. 
• Increase future business.  ** 
• Enhance company image and reputation.  ** 
• Benefit its non-defense business. 
• Minimize loss of skilled personnel.  ** 
• Broaden the allocation base for fixed costs.  ** 
[Ref. 13] 
Although there are a number of other methods for 
incentivizing contractors for excellent performance, they 
are limited to rewards of money.  This gives the company 
increased profits in the short-run, however, it does very 
little to address the six needs listed above.  Award term 
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incentives give a company additional business in addition 
to additional money.  The new business gained satisfies 
four of the six needs (annotated with **).  In that light, 
additional business is much more valuable than short-term 
profit; keeping highly skilled personnel gainfully employed 
is very desirable, especially if the pool of talent in the 
market is small.  By using award term incentives, the 
Government sets up a long-term business relationship 
comparable to what commercial industry does with strategic 
purchasing relationships. 
These long-term business relationships are beneficial 
because they provide incentive for contractors to increase 
investment in new machinery, technology and equipment.  
Having a stable source of business for an extended period 
of time, with the added possibility of getting an extension 
of the performance period, a contractor’s risk is reduced.  
With risk lowered, a contractor is more willing to expend 
the funds required to acquire improved equipment and 
technology; this can lead to a higher quality product or 
service and lower prices for the Government.  This is a 
great example of a win-win situation. 
Long-term business relationships also reduce 
acquisition costs for both parties - the time and money 
that goes into successfully negotiating a new contract is 
substantial.  As an example of using award terms, as long 
as the Government is satisfied with contract performance, 
extending a contract from five to 15 years would 
potentially save a lot in acquisition costs (for both 
sides). 
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Award term contracts, if they are to be effective, 
will also improve communications between the Government and 
the contractor.  In order for this type of contract to 
succeed, constant feedback on contract performance needs to 
be provided by the Government to the contractor.  This 
feedback is what the contractor will use to adjust its 
performance of the contract.  Properly used, the feedback 
should improve performance and increase the likelihood of 
earning an award term.  Of course feedback needs to be 
useful information that can be used in the contractor’s 
analysis of its operation.  Saying that performance is 
“acceptable” is not sufficient.  The importance of choosing 
the correct standards to evaluate contractor performance is 
apparent in this feedback phase. 
2. Potential Award Term Disadvantages 
The obvious disadvantage of using the award term 
incentive is that the monitoring and feedback necessary for 
award term contracting consumes resources (manpower, time 
and money).  The contracting officer must decide: 
• Who will observe contractor performance? 
• What will be observed? 
• When will observations take place? 
• Where will observations be made? 
• How will observations be made? 
These decisions must be carefully thought out.  Making 
the correct decisions in this early stage sets the 
foundation for the Government getting the performance that 
it desires.  Resources must be strategically utilized to 
effectively monitor contractor performance.  A good 
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monitoring program generates the information required to 
provide effective feedback to the contractor. 
The requirement to provide frequent feedback to the 
contractor makes the process of monitoring contractor 
performance an extremely time-sensitive event.  If feedback 
is not provided back to the contractor in time to influence 
performance (if necessary), then the feedback is useless; 
the purpose of award term contracting is defeated in this 
situation. 
Another perceived disadvantage of award term 
contracting is the high level of analysis, planning and 
negotiation that is required.  Both parties need to have a 
clear understanding of what the requirements are.  Metrics 
must be carefully chosen – they must be effective measures 
of performance.  This in-depth analysis and careful 
selection of metrics again uses up valuable resources. 
The goal of award term contracting is to establish 
long-term business relationships similar to what are seen 
in the commercial sector.  However, a potential 
disadvantage of the long-term relationship is the 
likelihood of conducting business at less than an arm’s 
length basis.  The longer the Government works with a 
contractor, the greater the chance that standards will be 
relaxed and deficiencies will be overlooked. 
Long-term business relationships can also make the 
Government marketplace seem less attractive to potential 
suppliers.  Long-term relationships with one firm might 
knock other contractors from the marketplace or prevent 
others from even attempting to enter.  This can lead to 
less competition, which has the potential to hurt the 
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Government in the future (higher prices or lower quality 
service/products). 
Another requirement when utilizing award term 
contracting is that all contract performance periods must 
be pre-priced [Ref. 5].  This is because the Government is 
prohibited by CICA from negotiating the prices after the 
contract has been signed.  Boards of Contract Appeals look 
at a lack of pre-pricing as a sole source contract action, 
which requires a Justification and Approval (J&A), in 
accordance with CICA.  If it is determined by the J&A 
approval authority that price competition is available, the 
J&A would most likely be disapproved.  With that in mind, 
if a contract has ten possible award terms that can be 
earned, each one of those award terms must be pre-priced 
before the contract is signed.  That can be a scary 
proposition for a potential contractor.  Few contractors 
may be able to reliably predict accurate prices ten years 
in advance. 
C. FACTORS AFFECTING THE DECISION TO USE AWARD TERM 
A contract utilizing award terms is involved in a 
continuous process that rewards good performance, 
incentivizes a contractor to improve unsatisfactory 
performance and records the Government’s evaluation of a 
contractor’s performance.  Using award terms gives the 
Government the opportunity to evaluate a contractor’s 
performance and, if necessary, input changes in the award 
term plan to accurately depict changes in Government 
priorities. 
The award term incentive might also be appropriate in 
those instances when key elements of performance cannot be 
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objectively or quantitatively measured.  The incentive can 
be (and has been) used with any type of contract vehicle 
(e.g. FFP, FPIF, CPIF).  While it can be used in a wide 
variety of procurement actions, the incentive is 
particularly suited for the procurement of services, where 
it is difficult to objectively define what is really 
required and what is good effort.  Before entering into a 
contract with award terms, the Government should consider 
the following factors: 
1. Contractor Motivation 
Using award terms motivates a contractor to allocate 
resources into the areas that are critical to a program’s 
success.  However, the award term plan must clearly 
identify the specific areas of performance that are most 
important to the Government.  The areas of performance must 
be limited in number and carefully chosen.  Too many 
performance areas will pull the contractor in too many 
different directions, possibly resulting in unsatisfactory 
performance.  Poorly chosen performance areas will not give 
the Government an accurate reading of actual performance. 
2. Administrative Issues 
The benefits received from using an award term in a 
contract have to outweigh the additional costs of properly 
administering the contract.  The use of award term 
incentives places a big administrative burden on the 
Government and the contractor.  Costs to consider when 
conducting the cost-benefit analysis include Government 
man-hours and materials required to monitor the 
contractor’s performance and perform the actual award term 
review board, contractor man-hours and materials required 
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to document their performance and make presentations to the 
award term review board, and appropriate training for 
Government and contractor personnel.  Due to the 
requirement for continuous performance monitoring, this 
labor-heavy endeavor can quickly drain the Government’s 
labor resource pool.  In this era of the shrinking 
workforce, the use of the award term incentive must be 
carefully thought out. 
3. Market Situation 
A thorough understanding of the market is critical to 
the decision to use award terms.  Communications with 
industry must be conducted to determine whether the use of 
award terms is appropriate.  Points to consider include:  
properly defining performance levels to be rewarded, 
contract types to be utilized, contract length, contractor 
investment requirements and determining fair and reasonable 
prices (especially for the award terms). 
The use of the award term incentive should be 
considered primarily for competitive acquisitions.  Not 
much is gained for the Government with the use of award 
terms in sole source situations.  If there is no fear of 
business going elsewhere, there is not much motivation for 
a contractor to perform above average for additional time 
on a contract. 
The proper use of award terms sets the foundation for 
a win-win situation.  Its use signals that quality 
contractor performance will lead to a continued business 
relationship as long as the Government requirement 
continues to exist and funds are available.  While any type 
of contract type can be utilized with the award term 
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incentive, it seems that the Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite 
Quantity (IDIQ) contracts work best with award terms.  The 
use of IDIQ contracts allows the award terms to be added 
without having to commit future fiscal year monies before 
they are appropriated.    
D. AWARD TERM PLAN 
The award term strategy for a contract is outlined in 
the award term plan.  The plan lays out the way to properly 
implement the award term clauses of the contract [Ref 5].  
The plan also details the methodology for evaluating the 
contractor’s performance during the evaluation periods.  
Appendix B contains an example of a generic award term 
plan.  The objectives of the award term plan are: 
• Create a plan that is workable and has a high 
chance for success. 
• Create an effective communication channel between 
the Government and the contractor, especially in 
regards to evaluation procedures. 
• Give the contractor insight to what areas of 
performance are most important to the Government.  
This allows the contractor to allocate resources 
in a most efficient manner. 
Points to consider when developing an award term plan 
should include the following: 
1. Identify Personnel Involved with the Award Term 
Incentive and Detail Their Responsibilities 
In order to avoid the need for administrative changes 
when individual members transfer out, identify the TDO and 
ATRB members by title/position only. 
2. Document Evaluation Periods 
Contract performance is split into evaluation periods.  
These evaluation periods can end on specific dates or 
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milestones.  When milestones are used, the evaluation 
periods shall end either at milestone completion or at the 
estimated milestone completion date.  Evaluation periods 
can also be established by duration with start and end 
dates.  Evaluation periods need not be equal in length. 
When setting evaluation periods, choosing the correct 
length for them is extremely important.  Evaluation periods 
that are too short do not give the contractor enough time 
to improve identified areas of weakness.  Short evaluation 
periods become an administrative burden and lead to rushed 
evaluations.  Lengthy evaluation periods can hinder 
effective communications between the Government and the 
contractor, diminishing the Government’s ability to 
influence the contractor’s performance.  Choosing the 
correct evaluation length is crucial to ensuring that 
effective communications occur between the Government and 
the contractor.  Successful use of evaluation periods in 
the past has centered on periods approximately six months 
or one year in length.  However, the correct length for any 
given contract should be determined based on the specific 
work that is being performed. 
3. Identify and Explain the Grading System Used for 
Evaluation Periods.  Also List the Weighting 
Scale That will be Used (if Necessary) 
The Government and the contractor need to understand 
the criteria and its measurement in evaluating contract 
performance.  An important step in this process is defining 
the grades, categories of performance and evaluation 
criteria.  Each of these areas should be specific to the 
goals of the contract.  Clearly defined and understandable 
criteria help the TDO ensure that the final determination 
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is based on preset objectives and not subjective opinions.  
This is especially important with a service-type 
requirement where, despite the best efforts of the 
negotiating parties, performance is largely based on 
subjective opinions. 
Grades can be of any variety; the key is to clearly 
define them.  Three grade (Unsatisfactory, Satisfactory, 
Excellent) and five grade (Unsatisfactory, Satisfactory, 
Good, Very Good, Excellent) systems are common examples of 
the ranges that can be used.  The range of grade points 
that can be assigned to each grade should be clearly 
documented in the award term plan.  Final performance 
scores are calculated by summing the weighted grade points 
(if weighting is used) earned in each performance category. 
Categories of performance are tailored to the 
individual acquisition; there is no standard set of 
categories to be used in any procurement.  The categories 
chosen should reflect what is important to the Government.  
Some of the more common categories that can be used include 
cost, quality and schedule.  The relative importance of 
each category depends on the needs of the acquisition. 
The evaluation criteria used to grade each category of 
performance must be clearly stated in the award term plan.  
The criteria should provide the contractor with the 
motivation to try to improve performance.  If the criteria 
is not properly defined in the award term plan, confusion 
will exist and evaluations will not provide proper feedback 
to the contractor. 
As contract performance progresses from one evaluation 
period to the next, the relative importance of specific 
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performance criteria may change [Ref 5].  One way to 
address this situation is to use percentage weightings to 
indicate the relative priorities assigned to the various 
categories of performance.  When documenting this in the 
award term plan, make sure that the total assigned weights 
total 100. 
Properly defining the grading system is important to 
the success of the contract.  Whatever evaluation format is 
chosen, both sides need to understand the implication of 
its use.  Agreement and understanding of the evaluation 
system at the beginning of the contract avoids claims from 
the contractor during or at the end of performance.  Since 
the Government’s award term decision is disputable under 
the Contract Disputes Act, the Government must be able to 
defend its evaluation process and show that it has 
conducted the evaluations in the manner specified in the 
contract. 
4. Document the Evaluation Process 
The evaluation process must be considered when the 
award term plan is drafted.  This critical process 
determines what portions of the contractor’s performance 
are evaluated and how they are evaluated.  This function 
must be clearly understood; training on it needs to be 
conducted for all personnel involved.  Topics that need to 
be addressed include: 
• What is the award term incentive? 
• What is being evaluated under this contract? 
• What techniques will be used in gathering 
information/data (e.g. samples, observations, 
interview, surveys)? 
• What is the frequency of data collection? 
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• Standards of conduct. 
There are two types of evaluations that need to be 
explained: 
a. Interim Evaluations 
The interim evaluation is the vehicle that 
ensures that effective, continual communication is 
conducted between the Government and the contractor.  This 
communication provides the information the contractor needs 
to understand the Government’s rating of performance and 
pinpoints the areas that need improvement.  Formal interim 
evaluations conducted during an evaluation period should 
identify both strengths and weaknesses in overall 
performance during a given period.  Figure 1 outlines what 







Figure 1. Interim Evaluation Process[From Ref. 5] 
 
The ATRB Recorder issues reminders to the 
Performance Monitors to submit their interim evaluations 
before the mid-point of the evaluation periods.  
Performance Monitors look at the overall performance of the 
contractor and note areas that need improvement and areas 
of strength.  The ATRB Recorder consolidates all the 
Performance Monitor evaluations into one report and 
















presents it to the ATRB.  Minutes of the mid-term 
evaluation board should be documented and the TDO should 
see the report prior to sending the report to the 
contractor. 
The mid-term evaluation sent to the contractor 
should address strengths and weaknesses of performance 
noted during the current evaluation period.  The report 
should not contain any point ratings.  The purpose of this 
report is to give the contractor an idea of the areas that 
need improvement; with enough time to affect the changes 
prior to the TDO’s point determination.  Additional reports 
can be sent to the contractor during the course of an 
evaluation period; however, the documents should be sent 
through the contracting officer to the contractor.  The 
contractor’s response, including any plans for improving 



























Figure 2. End-of-Period Evaluation Process[From Ref.5] 
 
Figure 2 shows the flow of information for the 
end-of-period evaluation process.  The ATRB Recorder issues 
reminders to the Performance Monitors to submit their 
evaluations before the end of the evaluation period.  Once 
received, the ATRB Recorder condenses the evaluations into 
a summary evaluation, which is presented to the ATRB.  This 
summary can also be provided to the contractor, to give the 
contractor an opportunity to review and comment on the 
performance evaluation.  If provided to the contractor, the 
summary should not contain any actual ratings or grades.  
At this time, the contractor may submit a self-assessment 
of its performance during the evaluation period.  The ATRB 























uses the summary evaluation, the contractor’s self-
assessment and other information deemed pertinent to make 
an award term points determination to the TDO. 
The ATRB Chairman briefs the TDO on 
recommendations of awarded points and any changes that need 
to be made to the award term plan.  This briefing covers 
strengths and weaknesses in the contractor’s performance 
during the evaluation period.  To enhance continuous 
communication between the Government and the contractor, 
the contractor may be present at this briefing; however, 
the contractor should have no say in making the final 
decision.  If the contractor is not present at the TDO 
briefing, a debriefing for the contractor is appropriate. 
After the TDO decides on an overall rating, the 
contractor is notified of the determination.  A favorable 
report does not necessarily mean that an additional award 
term is awarded at this point.  As discussed earlier, if 
the “incremental point scoring” method is utilized, the 
points awarded may not be enough to warrant the additional 
award term.  As an example, assume a contract is awarded 
with an award term clause with a base period of six years 
and a contract maximum of ten years.  Also assume that base 
years and earned award term periods may be lost based on 
contractor performance, up to a minimum contract length of 
four years.  The award term plan specifies that +100 points 
have to be earned for an additional year of contract term 
and –100 points have to be earned to lose a year.  The 
award term plan also sets the amount of points available 
during any evaluation period to be +/-100 points.  Table 1, 
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below, is a possible representation of performance during 













1 80 80 No 80 
2 75 155 Yes 55 
3 -20 35 No 35 
4 85 120 Yes 20 
5 65 85 No 85 
 
Table 1. Evaluation Points Scoring Example 
 
Once the amount of points accumulated by the 
contractor exceeds 100, the Government issues a contract 
modification to extend the contract term.  Likewise, if the 
amount of points accumulated exceeds –100, then the 
Government decreases the contract term. 
5. Identify the Process for Changing the Award Term 
Plan 
Any changes to the award term plan should be 
coordinated with the ATRB and sent to the TDO for approval.  
After the changes are approved by the TDO, the contracting 
officer notifies the contractor in writing of the changes.  
Unilateral changes to award term plans are allowable as 
long as the contractor is provided written notification 
from the contracting officer before the start of the 
evaluation period.  To make changes during a current 
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evaluation period, a mutual agreement between the 
Government and the contractor is required.  In the interest 
of developing and nurturing the strategic partnership, 
unilateral changes to the award term plan should be kept to 
a minimum.  Issues that call for changes to the award term 
plan include: 
• Changes in ATRB membership. 
• Adjustments to weighting scales. 
• Changes to evaluation criteria. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter looked at the issues involved with the 
use of the award term incentive – both advantages and 
disadvantages.  Some of the decision factors to utilize 
this incentive were also analyzed, notably contractor 
motivation, administrative issues and the market situation.  
Finally, the award term plan was analyzed in detail to give 
the reader an understanding of what is involved in setting 
up the use of this incentive. 
The next chapter will analyze the results of the 
survey that was conducted in support of this research.  The 
focus of the survey was to gauge the Navy’s awareness of 
the award term incentive and to see if the issues raised in 




















The preceding chapters provide background information 
on the award term concept:  the definition, the use of the 
award term incentive and the issues that surround this new 
acquisition tool.  In this chapter, responses to the survey 
are analyzed to answer the primary question and the three 
secondary research questions.  Majority opinions/inputs, as 
well as some minority opinions, for each of the survey 
questions are presented.  The online survey, conducted from 
10 September 2001 to 9 October 2001, was developed with 
assistance from the NPS Office of Strategic Planning, 
Educational Assessment and Institutional Research (SPEAR).  
Each survey response was assigned a number (e.g. Survey 
One) to prevent association of any information or quote 












B. OVERVIEW OF DATA COLLECTED 
1.  Please enter your command name. (Optional) 
2.  Please enter your name and position title. (Optional) 
3.  Please enter your phone number and e-mail address. 
(Optional) 
4.  Has your command awarded a contract that utilizes an 
award term incentive? 
a.  Yes     b.  No 
5.  If the answer to Question #4 is “No”, are you aware 
of the award term incentive? 
a.  Yes     b.  No 
6.  What product/service was procured? 
7.  What type of contract was utilized?  (Check all that 
apply) 
a.  FFP     b.  FPIF     c.  FPIS     d.  CPFF          
e.  CPIF    f.  IDIQ 
8.  What period of time does the contract cover, 
including the award term periods (Example:  four base 
years plus six award terms, for a total of ten years)? 
9.  What type of training has been provided to your 
procurement personnel regarding the award term incentive? 
10. Have you experienced any problems utilizing the award 
term incentive?  If so, what were they? 
11. List 2-5 factors that drove the decision to utilize 
the award term incentive. 
12. List 2-5 major issues involved with properly 
implementing the award term incentive. 
13. List 2-5 advantages you see for utilizing the award 
term incentive. 
14. List 2-5 disadvantages you see for utilizing the 
award term incentive. 
15. If your organization does not use the award term 
incentive in its contracts, why not (Example:  lack of 
training, legal concerns, etc.)? 
16. Other comments?  Thank you for your time! 
 
Table 2. Survey Questions 
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As Table 2 shows, the survey was comprised of sixteen 
questions, with the first three questions designed to 
collect information on the respondents.  The questions, a 
mix of multiple choice and fill-in-the-blank types, were 
sent out via e-mail to seventy commands.  Commands that had 
a high probability of having a contracting organization 
were chosen to receive the survey.  Responses received 
totaled twenty-seven, representing eighteen commands, for a 
command response rate of 26%. 
The two most basic questions in the survey were 
structured to gauge knowledge of and use of the award term 
incentive.  Knowledge of the award term incentive is 
important because if there is no knowledge, then there is 
no way that it can be used.  Since the award term incentive 
is a relatively new concept, the number of commands with 
knowledge of the incentive was expected to be low; even 
though the concept has been discussed in recent DOD 
writings and professional journals (e.g. Contract 
Management).  It was not known to what extent Government 
acquisition professionals are able to stay current with 
acquisition trends.  Figure 3 shows that Government 
contracting officers do keep up with the current trends and 
ideas - 83% of the survey respondents were aware of the 
award term incentive. 
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Figure 3. Commands Aware of Award Term Incentive 
 
The number of commands that actually used the award 
term incentive was expected to be relatively low.  
Discussion of the concept just started showing up in 
writings in 2000, so Navy usage was not predicted to be 
especially high.  The survey results validated that 
assumption, showing that only three of the eighteen 
commands that responded have actually used the award term 
incentive (see Figure 4).  Additional surveys stated that 
contracts utilizing the incentive were in the pipeline; 
however, those responses were from organizations that 
already used the incentive. 
With the basic questions of awareness and use of the 
award term incentive answered, the focus of the next 
sections is to analyze the issues, problems, advantages and 
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disadvantages that were listed by the respondents.  What 
has been procured using the award term incentive will also 
be looked at to see if a pattern of use is established for 
other commands to follow. 





















Figure 4. Commands That Used The Award Term Incentive 
 
C. ANALYSIS 
1. What is Being Procured and How is it Being 
Procured? 
Three commands responded that the award term incentive 
was being utilized in some of their contracts.  All of the 
contracts involved services, including: 
• Program management. 
• Logistics management. 
• Engineering. 
• Financial management. 
• Port Handling services. 
• Warehousing services. 
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• Delivery services. 
The scopes of the contracts vary considerably.   In 
one case, the management of fasteners was chosen as a test 
case to measure the effectiveness of the award term 
incentive.  It is a newly awarded, small contract providing 
warehousing, quality assurance, delivery, troubleshooting 
and some technical research.  If this test case works out, 
the intent is to use the incentive in other contracts.  The 
specific comment is as follows: 
Survey Nine: 
So given the nature of the other services 
required above and beyond just providing 
fasteners, there is a huge service component of 
this contract.  Therefore, since much of the 
services can be tracked and measured, it made 
perfect sense to use a term contract. 
That award term incentive is being used in the 
procurement of services is not surprising; all contracts 
utilizing the award term incentive awarded to date have 
been for procuring services.  In the initial survey 
responses, the procurement of fasteners (Survey Nine) was 
the first instance of using the incentive to procure a 
commodity item.  Follow-up, however, showed the acquisition 
was in fact more of a service contract. 
The survey found that the award term incentive was 
primarily used in IDIQ contracts (two of the three commands 
used IDIQs) although firm fixed-price contracts also used 
it.  This follows the research conclusion that the 
incentive functions best with the IDIQ type contract 
because it does not require committing future fiscal year 
funds before the money is appropriated. 
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Understandably, lengths of the contracts vary.  The 
contracts from the survey all had a base year and then 
possible award terms ranging from three to ten years.  One 
of the contracts added option years to the mix.  Award 
terms generally were in the three to four year range.  This 
relatively short length of time is probably because the 
incentive is still new and Government contracting officers 
want to see how the incentive works before committing to 
additional years. 
2. What Type of Training has been Provided to Your 
Procurement Personnel? 
The majority opinion in regards to training is that 
little or no training is provided on the subject.  Some of 
the comments include: 
Survey Fifteen: 
Award term training was a one-hour training 
session conducted by the Small Business 
specialist. 
Survey Fourteen: 
No formal training has been provided.  Have seen 
briefings talking about it. 
Despite the lack of training, contracting personnel 
are learning about the incentive through other resources.  
One survey respondent commented that despite the lack of 
command training, he has been exposed to the incentive via 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) classes and 
professional publications like Contract Management.  
Several respondents also reported attending award term 
seminars conducted by Mr. Vernon J. Edwards, a specialist 
in Federal contracting who has written numerous articles on 
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the subject.  Knowledge of the award term incentive is 
slowly making its way into Navy procurement activities; 
however, a more aggressive training program needs to be 
adopted to use it more widely. 
3. Have Any Problems been Experienced Utilizing the 
Award Term Incentive? 
There has been insufficient contract administration 
time to determine if there are any problems associated with 
the use of the award term incentive.  One respondent did 
raise the legal issue that was discussed earlier: 
Survey One: 
Local counsel does not feel that award term 
contracts are compatible with the FAR and has 
therefore disallowed its use at this activity. 
This one individual’s narrow interpretation of a FAR 
paragraph, despite the support of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Technology, prevents a command 
from utilizing a commercial best practice tool.  At the 
same time, another command that reports to the same SYSCOM 
uses the incentive in one of its contracts.  This is a good 
example of conflicting views of the incentive. 
Another interesting comment offered to this question 
revolved around knowledge and training: 
Survey Twenty-Three: 
This is the first contract with award term 
incentives for us.  Since the concept is new, it 
was very hard for us to have the requiring 
activity understand it.  Performance-Based 
Services Acquisition (PBSA) concepts have not 
been familiar to the requiring activities 
(commands vice contracting offices).  Since we 
have not trained well in this new concept, it is 
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hard for us to answer all of their questions. 
Before the award term incentive will be widely used 
and accepted, the knowledge has to be in the contracting 
workforce.  The knowledge is not just for the benefit of 
the contracting personnel, but also for the requiring 
activities and the contractors.  If the Government 
contracting officer cannot adequately explain the 
incentive, no one is going to want to use it.  Proper 
training is a must. 
4. What are the Key Factors in Deciding to use the 
Award Term Incentive? 
The factor most cited by the survey respondents was 
the desire to incentivize strong contractor performance.  
That thought showed up in every response.  The next most-
popular response was the need to develop a long-term 
relationship with a quality contractor.  These factors fall 
in line with the procurement of services. 
Survey Twenty-Three: 
Management direction to increase the number of 
PBSA contracts was a driving factor in the 
decision to utilize the award term incentive (USD 
AT&L direction that DOD establishes, at a 
minimum, that 50% of service acquisitions, 
measured in both dollars and actions, are to be 
performance-based by year 2005).  The award term 
incentive is the most understandable concept to 
the customers (extending the term is similar to 
option exercise). 
If a quality contractor provides excellent service, 
why should the service be re-competed at the end of a 
three-year period?  The costs and risks associated with 
putting out a new RFP for the services do not make good 
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business sense.  Industry would not do that.  If the 
Government is to truly adopt commercial best practices, it 
should have the opportunity to continue dealing with that 
contractor on a long-term basis. 
Survey Seven: 
Award term incentive incentivizes the contractor 
to provide quality service at reasonable prices.  
Allows a program manager to keep an incumbent if 
he is happy with performance and price.  Allows 
the contractor to understand our business and 
help us improve our business practices.  Allows 
the contractor to make long-term commitments with 
their subcontractors. 
The benefits of a long-term relationship affect more 
than just the Government and the contractor.  The 
relationship allows the contractor to foster long-term 
relationships with its subcontractors.  The ripple effect 
of a relationship fostered by the award term incentive is 
felt far down the supply chain. 
One respondent expressed cynicism for the use of the 
incentive: 
Survey Eight: 
The award term incentive is an acquisition 
buzzword that people wanted to state has been 
implemented at their command. 
Certainly, some commands might award a token contract 
utilizing the award term incentive just to be able to say 
that the incentive was tried.  If the Government truly 
wants to adopt best commercial practices, this temptation 
must be resisted.  Effective training is essential to 
breaking down any cynicism. 
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5. What are the Major Issues with Properly 
Implementing the Use of the Award Term Incentive? 
Communication was the issue that appeared on most of 
the surveys.  The importance of constant, effective 
communications was stressed in many of the survey 
responses.  As presented in the literature review in 
regards to the award term incentive, good communication is 
the foundation for successful contract execution. 
Survey Twenty-Five: 
On-going communication between the Government and 
the contractor on performance is required.  If 
the contractor’s performance is not going well, 
the Government must demonstrate the commitment to 
follow through with not awarding additional terms 
(use the hammer). 
In addition to effective communication, the need to 
properly anticipate the workload requirements of award term 
utilization was raised as an issue.  In this era of 
downsizing, taking on additional responsibilities with 
fewer people is an area of concern for some of the 
commands. 
Survey Six: 
The administration time required to properly 
implement interim evaluations, end of year 
evaluations and monitor reports is a major 
concern. 
Survey Eight added: 
Workload considerations, economic conditions and 
numerous other variables raise serious questions 
about the utility and variability of the award 
term incentive.  Administrative burden of 
conducting award term determinations will be big. 
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6. What are the Advantages of Utilizing the Award 
Term Incentive? 
An advantage that contradicts the issue of the extra 
administration time that is required with the use of the 
award term incentive is the time saved by not having to 
conduct follow-on procurement for recurring services. 
Survey Two: 
Reduced man-hours based on no need to do follow-
on procurement for recurring services. 
Survey Three: 
Saving the administrative cost and time 
associated with new acquisitions. 
Survey Six: 
Should save the Government time and money (for 
re-competes of professional support services 
contract every five years, time is usually lost 
when the services transition to a new 
contractor). 
If time is added to one portion of the acquisition 
process (e.g. contractor performance evaluations), but time 
is saved on another portion of the acquisition process 
(e.g. re-competes for services), is there a real problem?  
Acquisition is all about tradeoffs and the use of the award 
term incentive is no exception. 
Other advantages mentioned include incentivizing good 
performers, establishing long-term relationships with 
world-class contractors, allowing the contractor to 
maintain a stable workforce and fostering improved 
communications and teamwork between the Government and the 
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contractor.  Survey Thirteen summed up the advantages of 
the award term incentive: 
Businesses want “repeat business”.  Award term 
contracts provide excellent incentives – in many 
cases, this is probably a better incentive than 
an extra percent or two of award fee.  
Potentially provides a tremendous reduction in 
administrative expenses associated with planning, 
soliciting, evaluating and awarding contracts, 
since a single “expenditure” of the contract 
award process can support a program for many 
years (e.g. potentially up to 15 years). 
7. What are the Disadvantages of Utilizing the Award 
Term Incentive? 
Accurately forecasting Government requirements and 
award term pricing in the out-years is a major concern for 
the survey respondents. 
Survey Six: 
The ability to accurately forecast Government 
requirements for such a long period of 
performance is a disadvantage.  Are our forecasts 
for the out-years going to be meaningful, fair 
and reasonable? 
Survey Fifteen added: 
Significant changes occur over time that just 
cannot be anticipated both in terms of the 
requirements and services provided.  Assurance of 
a fair and reasonable price over the long run is 
paramount. 
Even if the uneasiness of forecasting prices and 
requirements far into the future is overcome, there is 
still the contractor’s unfamiliarity with the award term 
that must to be addressed.  For example, ensuring that the 
award term review board is involved in the process and 
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evaluates performance in accordance with the provisions set 
forth in the contract is important to the contractor.  
However, as Survey Nine points out: 
For contractors who have had award fees in the 
past that are usually paid each year, this is an 
income stream.  Where a term incentive contract 
has no income, there will be no benefits realized 
until the end of the contract.  If the need goes 
away prior to exercising any of the award terms, 
the terms are lost and the contractor gets 
nothing.  If I was a vendor and I had a 
relatively guaranteed income as compared to a 
potential term extension, I think that the 
Government might see some reluctance on my part 
for using award terms. 
Although contractors are accustomed to this type of 
relationship in the commercial world, it is a new idea in 
the Government sector.  Old mindsets must be broken for 
this incentive to generate the desired results.  Once 
again, effective training plays a significant part in 
contractor education. 
8. If Your Organization does not Use the Award Term 
Incentive, Why Not? 
Answers to this question mirror issues already 
discussed.  Issues mentioned the most include: 
• Legal issues. 
• Lack of understanding and training 
• Too new of a tool to use. 
The newness of the concept leaves people unsure of the 
real benefits of its use.  Survey 15 expressed one such 
concern: 
This is not considered advantageous when all the 
factors are considered.  It requires close 
monitoring and/or much more detailed research to 
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implement and still have an expectation that 
prices will remain competitive in the long-run, 
especially considering both internal 
organizational changes and external influences. 
Survey 22 also expressed some doubts as to the 
incentive’s real value: 
A tool that may be of marginal value in support 
services contracts.  I believe that the best-
value source selection, encompassing evaluation 
of past performance, incentivizes contractors to 
the extent necessary. 
Survey 3 echoed this feeling: 
A properly structured competitive proposal 
evaluation, which gave appropriate weight to past 
performance, should theoretically be able to 
reward good performance without the concomitant 
inflexibility and difficulties associated with 
the award term vehicle. 
9. Where to Go with the Award Term Incentive 
The results of the survey confirm what has already 
been written on the award term incentive.  No new issues, 
advantages or disadvantages of its use were uncovered.  The 
survey did show that some uncertainties exist as to the use 
and worth of the award term incentive.  However, survey 
respondents understand the value of establishing long-term 
relationships with contractors, especially when contracting 
for services.  Lack of knowledge and training are the 
biggest hurdles that must be overcome for the Navy to 
effectively utilize this incentive. 
Before tackling the knowledge and training issues, the 
Navy needs to make a decision.  Does the Navy want to use 
the award term incentive in its contracts?  In his memo of 
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November 2000, Dr. Gansler listed the award term incentive 
as one of the price-based acquisition techniques 
recommended to move towards greater access to commercial 
technologies, products and processes [Ref. 1].  The Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development and Acquisition (DON RD&A) needs to make a 
determination of the legality of the award term incentive.  
It does not make sense to have one command under a SYSCOM 
not use the incentive because of the legal concerns while 
another command under the same SYSCOM uses it.  The legal 
issue should be resolved at the top of the chain.  If the 
incentive is deemed legal, then DON RD&A should prepare and 
submit the language for a FAR/DFARS entry detailing the use 
of the award term incentive.  If the Navy is serious about 
acquisition reform, the leadership must become involved and 
drive the issue. 
Once the legal issue is settled, the next step is to 
develop training for the contracting commands, contractors 
and users.  Each of the groups needs to have an 
understanding of the incentive.  Government contracting 
officers and contractors need in-depth knowledge; however, 
the users also need to understand how the incentive affects 
their relationships in the procurement of services.  The 
Air Force is a good source of information for developing 
training requirements.  Having set up an office at the Air 
Force Materiel Command that deals exclusively with award 
term issues, the knowledge there would be invaluable in 
setting up a Navy training program.  The National Contract 
Management Association (NCMA) is another good source of 
training information.  Having already developed a fast 
response seminar on the topic (which has already been given 
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to some Navy commands), it can provide additional seminars.  
Web-based tutorials can also be developed and placed on 
websites such as the Department of the Navy’s acquisition 
website, www.acq-ref.navy.mil, or the Naval Supply Systems 
Command (NAVSUP) website, www.navsup.navy.mil.  Effective 
training gives all parties concerned a level of comfort in 
using the incentive.  Once the training is in place, the 
next step is to actually use the incentive in contracts. 
The first contracts using the award term incentive 
should be basic procurements – just enough to get 
contracting personnel (Government and contractor) exposed 
to the use of the incentive.  As people get more 
comfortable with using the incentive, procurements of a 
more ambitious scope can be attempted.  From the readings 
and the survey, the incentive works best in the procurement 
of services; so these types of contracts should be the 
first to use the incentive.  As familiarity and skill in 
using the incentive increases, other uses can be explored. 
Protests have not yet been an issue with the award 
term incentive.  That can change as the first contracts to 
utilize the incentive begin to approach the award terms.  
The acquisition reform offices at DON RD&A and NAVSUP will 
have to work with the Air Force award term office and 
monitor the Air Force contracts that first used the 
incentive.  As issues are brought up with those contracts, 
lessons learned from the contracts can be used in future 
Navy contracts. 
If DOD really wants to pursue commercial best 
practices and have the PBSA and PBA initiatives gain 
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momentum, the use of the award term incentive must succeed.  
As Survey Twenty-Three stated it: 
Award term incentive is the most understandable 
initiative to customers and contractors. 
If an initiative that is so close to existing 
contracting vehicles (e.g. award-fee and options) cannot 
succeed, how can the more ambitious initiatives that are 
proposed in Dr. Gansler’s memo of November 2000 hope to be 
incorporated into Government contracting?  The answer is 
that with direction from the Navy’s acquisition leadership, 
training and careful planning, the award term incentive 
will be a success. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Information collected from the on-line survey was 
analyzed to measure the Navy’s awareness of the award term 
incentive and to gauge its willingness to utilize the 
incentive.  Survey responses show that knowledge of the 
incentive is high, but confusion as to its legality and use 
exist.  Actions that the Navy can take to clear up the 
issues surrounding the incentive and promote its use were 
discussed. 
The final chapter focuses on the conclusions and 
recommendations developed during this research.  The 
primary and secondary research questions are summarized and 









V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research was undertaken to determine the Navy’s 
awareness of the award term incentive.  The purpose of the 
research was to identify the factors and issues integral to 
the successful implementation of the award term incentive 
in Navy contracts.  From the research, a number of points 
can be made: 
1. The Navy is Aware of the Award Term Incentive 
The results of the survey show that Navy contracting 
officers are aware of the award term incentive.  This shows 
that Navy contracting professionals keep up with the 
current trends in Government contracting.  The exposure to 
the new trends and ideas comes from various sources:  
command training, DAU courses, professional organizations 
(e.g. NCMA) and professional journals/magazines (e.g. 
Contract Management).  It is important for contracting 
officers to stay abreast of the changes, especially with 
today’s pressure to move towards commercial best practices.  
It is equally important that the Navy leadership allow its 
contracting professionals the time to keep their 
contracting skills up-to-date. 
2. The Legality of Award Term is Still a Question at 
Navy Commands 
Survey results show that legal issues prevent some 
commands from using the award term incentive.  That does 
not make sense given the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Technology’s endorsement of its use.  Navy 
leadership must reiterate that the use of the award term 
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incentive as a best commercial practice is encouraged.  
Take the decision to use the award term incentive away from 
the individual command legal officers and give it to the 
contracting officers.  Each contracting officer should have 
the award term incentive available for use.  It is not 
effective in every situation; however, that should be for 
the contracting officer to decide, not the legal officer. 
3. Improve Training and Use Award Term Incentive in 
Contracts 
There is no question that award term training needs to 
improve; there are many issues relating to setting up the 
incentive and monitoring contract performance that need to 
be explained.  The award term incentive is so similar to 
existing tools (e.g. options and award fee) that it should 
be relatively simple to develop a good training program.  
If the Navy is serious about acquisition reform, one of the 
Navy acquisition reform offices should take up the effort 
to develop a comprehensive training plan for Navy 
contracting officers.  DON RD&A’s Acquisition Reform Office 
has a mission to: 
Lead the Department of the Navy in continuously 
improving acquisition processes essential to 
delivering better products and services to the 
Warfighter in a smarter, cheaper, faster fashion. 
[Ref. 14] 
NAVSUP’s Acquisition Reform Office has a mission to: 
Advocate and facilitate activities necessary to 
accomplish the cultural and process changes 
needed to affect the acquisition reform goals of 
reducing acquisition costs, reducing process lead 
times, and improving product/service 
availability, performance and reliability. [Ref. 
15] 
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Developing a useful training guide for award term 
applies to either of those mission statements.  One of the 
acquisition reform offices should take the lead on this, 
not only for award term, but also for all the other 
initiatives that are being pushed.  This action is in the 
scope of the mission statements, plus it provides a 
valuable service to the subordinate commands.  The 
acquisition reform offices do not have to do this alone.  
Contact the Air Force for lessons learned from Air Force 
contracts.  They can contact the NCMA to see how it 
developed its Fast Response Seminar on the award term 
incentive.  Talk to the Navy commands that have already 
used the incentive in contracts.  There is a lot of 
information on the topic available; someone needs to tap 
into that information.  An acquisition reform office is a 
logical choice. 
Once the training is in place, the next step is to 
actually use the incentive in a contract.  Pick some 
contracts that are a good fit for the award term incentive 
and use them as test cases.  The test cases can be small 
contracts; the key is to use the incentive and see how it 
works for the command.  If the test cases do not work out, 
use the lessons learned to improve the use of the incentive 
in another contract.  If after using the incentive the 
feeling is that the incentive does not work for the 
command, do not use the incentive in follow-on contracts.  
It is important to try these new initiatives; it is the 
only way to find out if they work for the command. 
4. Award Term Remains Untested in Claims and 
Protests 
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Insufficient contract administration time exists to 
determine if there are any problems related to the use of 
the award term incentive.  As previously stated, 
acquisition reform offices at DON RD&A and NAVSUP need to 
monitor the Air Force contracts for protests and claims as 
those contracts begin to approach the award term periods.  
As lessons are learned from those contracts, training 
programs can be updated to allow the knowledge to be 
incorporated into upcoming Navy contracts.  The few Navy 
commands that have used the award term incentive can also 
feed the lessons learned from their contracts to the 
acquisition reform offices.  This feedback to a centralized 
location is ideal for distributing the information to all 
Navy contracting commands.  
B. SUMMARY AND REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What are the Primary Factors Involved in the 
Decision to Utilize the Award Term Incentive at 
U.S. Naval Procurement Activities, and what are 
the Issues Involved in the Effective Application 
of this incentive? 
The two major factors involved in the decision to 
utilize the award term incentive are the desire to foster 
long-term relationships with world-class suppliers and the 
need to incentivize strong contractor performance.  Award 
term is as close as the Government can get to the 
commercial best practice of working with whomever it wants.  
Using award term gives the Government the opportunity to 
develop relationships with these world-class suppliers by 
offering extended lengths of contract performance in return 
for outstanding contract support. 
The main issues involved in the decision to utilize 
the award term incentive are training, choosing evaluation 
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criteria and communication.  A proper training program 
erases many of the uncertainties that surround the award 
term incentive.  Training will help with choosing the 
correct evaluation criteria.  Choosing the correct 
evaluation criteria gives the contractor an idea of what is 
important to the Government in the performance of the 
contract.  The right evaluation criteria gives the 
contractor direction and will give the Government the 
service it desires.  Training also helps establish the 
importance of frequent communication between the Government 
and the contractor.  Communication is a critical component 
to making the award term incentive an effective tool.  
Failure to communicate leads to misunderstandings during 
performance evaluations, which eventually degrades contract 
performance. 
2. What is the Background and History of the Award 
Term Incentive? 
Award term is a relatively new concept that was first 
used by the Air Force in 1997.  It is described as a 
variation of the award fee incentive and is also similar to 
options.  This tool has received attention recently, after 
it was touted as a method for utilizing commercial best 
practices in Government contracting.  Mentioned in a 
November 2000 Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
and Technology memorandum and the December 2000 Guidebook 
for Performance-Based Services Acquisition in the DOD, 
articles on award term have been appearing in contracting 
publications and websites.  While not used widely in the 
Navy at this time, it is expected that more contracts will 
utilize this tool as awareness of the incentive increases. 
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3. What are the Advantages and Disadvantages of the 
Award Term Incentive? 
Advantages of using the award term incentive include: 
• Saves time and money by not requiring frequent 
re-procurement costs for recurring services. 
• Good way to incentivize good performers with 
additional business. 
• Using a commercial best practice attracts world-
class suppliers to Government contracting. 
The biggest advantages revolve around attracting the 
best suppliers with the lure of long-term business 
arrangements.  A benefit of engaging in long-term 
relationships is that the re-procurement costs for 
recurring services are significantly decreased for both the 
Government and the contractor – a definite win-win 
situation. 
Some disadvantages related to the use of award term 
exist: 
• Pricing of award terms in the out-years. 
• Unfamiliarity with award term incentive. 
Pricing of the award terms years in advance is a major 
issue for contractors.  There is no foolproof way of 
predicting what prices will be ten years in the future.  
Starting with shorter contract timelines when first using 
the incentive is one way to approach the problem, but then 
the advantage of not having the frequent re-procurement 
costs is diminished.  Communication is the key to this 
problem.  The benefits of a long-term relationship outweigh 
the uncertainty of future prices.  If both parties are 
serious about nurturing a relationship, the price issue can 
be resolved to the satisfaction of both sides. 
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Unfamiliarity with the incentive will go away as the 
tool is used.  Testing the incentive in small contracts 
will help identify the problems and make its use in 
additional contracts easier.  Watching how other commands 
use the tool will also provide insight and understanding. 
4. What are the Key Issues Involved with the 
Government’s Attempt to Implement the Award Term 
Incentive? 
Training and communication are the two major issues 
involved with successfully implementing the award term 
incentive.  One of the Navy’s acquisition reform offices 
must take the lead on developing an effective award term 
training program.  Good training sets the foundation for 
successful implementation of the tool in Navy contracting.  
By doing this, the acquisition reform office can set 
precedence for developing training programs for the other 
best commercial practices that are being touted (e.g. 
evolutionary development strategy, share-in-savings 
contracts and fixed-price variable outcome (FPVO) 
contracts). 
Communication is also important to the success of the 
incentive.  Effective communication provides the direction 
the contractor needs to provide the desired support.  Two-
way communication provides a means for defusing potential 
problems early in the process.  It is mandatory in a good 
long-term relationship. 
C. SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A goal of this research was to gauge award term 
incentive level-of-knowledge in Navy procurement 
organizations.  The knowledge is out there, but the use of 
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the incentive is still in the infancy stage.  Areas for 
future studies include: 
• Conduct a follow-up survey of Navy procurement 
activities to measure usage of the award term 
incentive; compare those results to the usage 
rate in 2001. 
• Conduct research on the Air Force contracts that 
first used the award term incentive as they 
operate in the award term periods.  Determine how 
claims and protests affect the use of the 
incentive in follow-on contracts. 
• Conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine if 
the re-procurement costs saved using the award 
term incentive outweigh the costs incurred by 
having to evaluate contractor performance during 
the life of the contract. 
• Analyze award term training programs that are 
being used by Navy procurement commands.  
Determine whether a centralized training program 
for commercial best practices would better serve 
Navy contracting officers. 
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APPENDIX A.  SAMPLE AWARD TERM CLAUSE [FROM REF. 8] 
(a) The initial _____ year [contract term or ordering 
period] may be extended or reduced, on the basis of 
contractor performance, resulting in a(n) [contract term or 
ordering period] lasting a minimum of _____ years from the 
date of contract award to a maximum of _____ years from the 
date of contract award. 
(b) Monitoring of Performance.  The contractor’s 
performance against the measures of merit will be 
continually monitored by the Performance Monitors whose 
findings are reported to the Award Term Review Board 
(ATRB).  The ATRB recommends award term points to the Term 
Determining Official (TDO) who makes the final decision of 
the award term points based on the contractor’s performance 
during the award term evaluation period. 
(c) Award Term Plan.  The evaluation criteria and 
associated grades are specified in the award term plan.  
The evaluation periods with the associated award term 
extensions/reductions and performance criteria with 
associated award term times are also specified in the award 
term plan. 
(d) Modification of Award Term Plan.  Unilateral 
changes may be made to the Award Term Plan if the 
contractor is provided written notification by the PCO 
before the start of the upcoming evaluation period.  
Changes affecting the current evaluation must be by 
bilateral agreement. 
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(e) Self-evaluation.  The contractor will submit to 
the Contracting Officer (CO) within _____ working days 
after the end of each award term evaluation period, a brief 
written self-evaluation of its performance for that period.  
This self-evaluation shall not exceed _____ pages.  This 
self-evaluation [will or may] be considered in the ATRB’s 
evaluation of the contractor’s performance during this 
period. 
(f) Award Term Extension.  The contract-ordering 
period may be unilaterally modified to reflect the TDO 
decision.  The total contract-ordering period including 
extensions under this clause will not exceed  _____ years.  
If at any time the ordering period or contract term has 
_____ years or less remaining, the operation of the award 
term feature will cease and the ordering period will not 
extend beyond the term set at that time. 
(g) Award term determinations and the methodology for 
determining award term are unilateral decisions made solely 
at the discretion of the Government. 
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APPENDIX B.  SAMPLE AWARD TERM PLAN [FROM REF. 5] 
A. INTRODUCTION 
a.  This award term plan is the basis for the [title 
of program] evaluation of the contractor’s performance and 
for presenting an assessment of that performance to the 
Term Determining Official (TDO).  Evaluation for term 
points will begin at the start of the contract.  An 
adjustment to the award term will not result in a contract 
ordering period of less than [minimum contract term] or 
greater than [maximum contract term] from the award of the 
contract.  This plan describes the specific criteria and 
procedures to be used to assess the contractor’s 
performance and to determine the amount of award term 
points earned.  Actual award term determinations and the 
methodology for determining the award term are unilateral 
decisions made solely at the discretion of the Government. 
b.  Any contract term extensions earned will be 
reflected in unilateral contract modifications based upon 
points earned as determined by the TDO.  The award term 
earned will be determined by the TDO based upon review of 
the contractor’s performance against the criteria set forth 
in this plan.  The TDO may unilaterally change this plan 
prior to the beginning of an evaluation period.  Changes to 
this plan that are applicable to a current evaluation 
period will be incorporated by mutual consent of both 
parties. 
B. ORGANIZATION 
The award term organization consists of the Term 
Determining Official (TDO); an Award Term Review Board 
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(ATRB) which consists of a chairperson, the Contracting 
Officer, a recorder, other functional area participants, 
and advisor members; and the Performance Monitors.  The 
TDO, ATRB members, and Performance Monitors are listed in 
Annex 1. 
C. RESPONSIBILITIES 
a. Term Determining Official.  The TDO approves the 
award term plan and any changes.  The TDO reviews the 
recommendation(s) of the ATRB, considers all pertinent 
data, and determines the earned award term points for each 
evaluation period.  The TDO appoints the ATRB Chairperson. 
b. Award Term Review Board.  ATRB members review 
performance monitors’ evaluation of the contractor’s 
performance, consider all information from pertinent 
sources, and arrive at an earned award term points 
recommendation to be presented to the TDO.  The ATRB may 
also recommend changes to this plan. 
c. ATRB Recorder.  The ATRB recorder is responsible 
for coordinating the administrative actions required by the 
Performance Monitors, the ATRB and the TDO. 
d. Contracting Officer.  The CO is the liaison between 
contractor and Government personnel.  The CO modifies the 
contract ordering period if necessary to reflect the 
decision. 
e. Performance Monitors.  Performance Monitors 
maintain written records of the contractor’s performance in 
their assigned evaluation area(s) so that a fair and 
accurate evaluation is obtained.  Monitors prepare interim 
and end-of-period evaluation reports as directed by the 
ATRB. 
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D. AWARD TERM PROCESSES 
a. Available Award Term Points.  The earned award term 
points will be based on the contractor’s performance during 
each evaluation period.  The available points for each 
evaluation period are shown in Annex 2.  An accumulation of 
positive [insert number of points] points is required for a 
one year extension and an accumulation of negative [insert 
number of points] results in a decrease in the contract 
ordering period of one year. 
b. Evaluation Criteria.  If the CO does not provide 
specific notice in writing to the contractor of changes to 
the evaluation criteria prior to the start of an evaluation 
period, the same criteria from the preceding period will be 
used in the subsequent evaluation period.  Any changes to 
evaluation criteria will be made by revising Annex 3 and 
notifying the contractor. 
c. Interim Evaluation Process.  The ATRB Recorder 
notifies each ATRB member and Performance Monitors [insert 
number of days] calendar days before the midpoint of the 
evaluation period.  Performance Monitors submit their 
evaluation reports to the ATRB [insert number of days] 
calendar days after this notification.  The ATRB 
Chairperson determines the interim evaluation results and 
notifies the contractor of the strengths and weaknesses for 
the current evaluation period.  At this time, the ATRB may 
also recommend any changes to the award term plan for TDO 
approval.  The CO may also issue letters at any other time 
when it is deemed necessary to highlight areas of 
Government concern. 
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d. End-of-Period Evaluations.  The ATRB Recorder 
notifies each ATRB member and Performance Monitor [insert 
number of days] calendar days before the end of the 
evaluation period.  Performance Monitors submit their 
evaluation reports to the ATRB [insert number of days] 
calendar days after the end of the evaluation period.  The 
contractor presents its self-assessment.  The ATRB 
Chairperson prepares its evaluation report and 
recommendation of earned award term points.  The ATRB 
Chairperson briefs the evaluation report and recommendation 
to the TDO.  The TDO determines the overall grade and 
earned award term points for the evaluation period within 
[insert number of days] calendar days after each evaluation 
period.  The TDO letter informs the contractor of the 
earned award term points and the total cumulative points.  
Upon the accumulation of sufficient award term points, the 
CO issues a modification within [insert number of days] 
calendar days after the TDO’s determination is made 
authorizing award extension or reduction reflecting the 
earned award term amount. 
e. Contractor’s Self-Assessment.  The contractor’s 
self-evaluation is submitted to the CO within [insert 
number of days] calendar days after the end of the 
evaluation period.  This written assessment of the 
contractor’s performance throughout the evaluation period 
may also contain any information that may be reasonably 
expected to assist the ATRB in evaluating the contractor’s 
performance.  The contractor’s self-assessment may not 
exceed [insert number of pages] pages. 
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E. AWARD TERM PLAN CHANGE PROCEDURE 
The TDO may unilaterally change this plan prior to the 
beginning of an evaluation period.  In addition, the 
contractor may recommend changes to the plan no later than 
[insert number of days] days prior to the beginning of the 
new evaluation period.  The contractor will be notified of 
changes to the plan by the CO, in writing, before the start 
of the affected evaluation period.  Changes to this plan 
that are applicable to a current evaluation period will be 
incorporated by the mutual consent of both parties. 
F. ANNEXES 
1. Award Term Organization 
Members 
Term Determining Official: [Position Title][Office Symbol] 
ATRB Chairperson:  [Position Title][Office Symbol] 
Award Term Review Board Members: 
 Deputy Program Director  [Office Symbol] 
 Program Manager   [Office Symbol] 
 Contracting Officer   [Office Symbol] 
 Recorder     [Office Symbol] 
 Legal Staff Member   [Office Symbol] 
 Financial Mgmt Staff Member [Office Symbol] 
 Plans Staff Member   [Office Symbol] 
 Director of Logistics  [Office Symbol] 
 Director of Engineering  [Office Symbol] 
 Director of Configuration  [Office Symbol] 
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 Major User Rep    [Office Symbol] 
 DCMA Rep     [Office Symbol] 
Performance Monitors 
Area of Evaluation     Performance Monitor 
Program Management    [Office Symbol] 
Cost and Schedule Management  [Office Symbol] 
Quality Assurance    [Office Symbol] 
Technology Insertion   [Office Symbol] 
Subcontract Management   [Office Symbol] 
 
2. Award Term Allocation by Evaluation Periods 
The award term earned by the contractor will be 
determined at the completion of evaluation periods shown 
below.  The award term points shown corresponding to each 
period is the maximum available award term amount that can 
be earned during that particular period. 
 
Evaluation Period From To Available Award Term 
    
First    
Through    
Last Period    
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NOTE:  The award term arrangement will continue using 
the yearly evaluation period during any additional years 
awarded up to a maximum of [insert number of 
years/periods].  If at any time after the completion of the 
transition period, the ordering period does not extend more 
than [insert time required for re-compete of requirement] 
from the TDO decision, the operation of the award term 
feature will cease and the ordering period will not extend 
beyond the term set at that time. 
 
+[insert number of points] award term points = 1 year 
term extension 
-[insert number of points] award term points = 1 year 
term reduction 
3. Evaluation Criteria (Sample) 
Program Management    25% of Total 
Cost and Schedule Management  25% of Total 
Quality Assurance    25% of Total 
Technology Insertion   15% of Total 
Subcontract Management   10% of Total 
Technology Insertion:  (Specific area of interest:  
contractor’s support of technical insertion into the 
system, which increases mission effectiveness, “openness” 







Unsatisfactory Contractor fails to implement technical 
developments, which lead to degradation of 
training service. 
Satisfactory Contractor implements technical 
developments, which improve services. 
Very Good Contractor implements technical 
developments, which significantly improve 
services. 
Excellent Contractor implements leading edge 
technology improvements, which 
substantially improve services. 
 
Subcontract Management:  (Specific areas of interest:  
Meeting goals of small business (SB) subcontracting). 
 
Unsatisfactory Contractor fails to meet goals of SB 
subcontracting plan. 
Satisfactory Contractor meets goals of SB 
subcontracting plan. 
Very Good SB percentage of total contract value 
between goal and _____%. 







4. Award Term Conversion Table 
Rating     Award Points 
    One-Year Cycle  6 Month Cycle 
Unsatisfactory  -100 to –1  -50 to –0.5 
Satisfactory  0 to +33   0 to +16.5 
Very Good   +34 to +66  +17 to +33 
Excellent   +67 to +100  +33.5 to +50 
 
5. Sequence of Events – Award Term Process 
Interim Evaluation (IE) (6 months into evaluation 
period): 
 
14 days prior 
to IE. 
Recorder notifies each ATRB member and 
Performance Monitor. 
7 days prior 
to IE. 
Performance Monitors submit evaluation 
reports to ATRB. 
14 days after 
IE. 
ATRB Chairperson determines interim 
evaluation results and notifies contractor 
of strengths and weaknesses. 
Normally at 
least 90 days 
prior to EOP. 
ATRB may recommend any changes to Award 
Term Plan to TDO (time must be allowed for 






End-of-Period (EOP) (End of 12 month evaluation 
period): 
 
14 days prior 
to EOP. 
Recorder notifies each ATRB member and 
Performance Monitor. 
14 days after 
EOP. 
Performance Monitors submit evaluation 
reports to ATRB.  ATRB forwards a copy to 
contractor.  Contractor submits self-
assessment to CO. 
21 days after 
EOP. 
Performance Monitors give oral 
presentations of evaluations to ATRB.  
Contractor has opportunity to address 
Performance Monitor Evaluation Reports. 
30 days after 
EOP. 
ATRB briefs evaluation report and 
recommendation to the TDO.  Contractor has 
opportunity to brief TDO. 
45 days after 
EOP. 
TDO informs contractor and CO of the 
earned award term points. 
15 days after 
TDO’s 
decision. 
CO issues a contract modification 





APPENDIX C.  LIST OF ACRONYMS 
1. ADA  - Anti-Deficiency Act 
  
2. AFFARS  - Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulations 
     Supplement 
 
3. AFIT  - Air Force Institute of Technology 
 
4. ATRB  - Award Term Review Board 
 
5. CICA  - Competition in Contracting Act 
 
6. CPIF  - Cost Plus Incentive Firm 
 
7. DAU  - Defense Acquisition University 
 
8. DOD  - Department of Defense 
 
9. DON RD&A  - Department of the Navy Research, 
     Development and Acquisition 
 
10. FAR  - Federal Acquisition Regulations 
 
11. FARA  - Federal Acquisition Reform Act 
 
12. FASA  - Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
 
13. FFP  - Firm Fixed Price 
 
14. FPIF  - Fixed Price Incentive Firm 
 
15. FPVO  - Fixed Price Variable Outcome 
 
16. IDIQ  - Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity 
 
17. J&A  - Justification and Approval 
 
18. NAVSUP  - Naval Supply Systems Command 
 
19. NCMA  - National Contract Management Association 
 
20. NPS  - Naval Postgraduate School 
 
21. ORD  - Operational Requirements Document 
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22. PBA  - Price-Based Acquisition 
 
23. PBSA  - Performance Based Services Acquisition 
 
24. RFP  - Request for Proposal 
 
25. SPEAR  – Strategic Planning, Educational Assessment 
     and Institutional Research 
 
26. TDO  - Term Determining Official 
 
27. USD   – Under Secretary of Defense 
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